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Abstract
Software system certification presents itself with many challenges, including
the necessity to certify the system at the level of functional requirements,
code and binary levels, the need to chase down run-time errors, and the
need for proving timing properties of the eventual, compiled system. This
paper illustrates possible approaches for certifying code that arises from con-
trol systems requirements as far as stability properties are concerned. The
relative simplicity of the certification process should encourage the develop-
ment of systematic procedures for certifying control system codes for more
complex environments.
1 Introduction
Discussions about analyzing software in a controls framework often oscillate
between trivial statements and feelings of doom dominated by undecidabil-
ity issues. Furthermore much of the intrinsic difficulty (or lack thereof) of
software analysis, even that designed by control systems engineers, hides
behind an intimidating language barrier, making tools and concepts devel-
oped by computer scientists hard to reach by controls specialists, and vice-
versa. This paper concentrates on the following question: Given a properly
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designed system (presumably a stable control system), what else needs to
be proven to convince the certification agency that the behavior is indeed
appropriate? We argue that the concept of “proof of good behavior” as cur-
rently taught in the control systems curriculum mostly focuses at the level
of “system specification”, meaning at a level where the system is unambigu-
ously defined, but does not constitute an executable code yet. By means of
example, consider the system
xk+1 = Axk, k = 0, 1, . . . x0 ∈ R
n, xT0 x0 ≤ 1 (1)
and ask whether the state x is always bounded. This question is usually
answered by checking various sufficient conditions such as (i) all eigenvalues
of A have modulus strictly less than one, or (ii) there exists a symmetric,
positive definite matrix P satisfying the Lyapunov inequality
ATPA− P < 0.
While much of the control systems community would consider the job to
be “done”, the fact is that the system (1) is not considered “executable”
except for high-level, non real-time environments such as MATLAB. The
program described in flowchart format in Fig. 1 is the accurate representa-
tion of what a real-time, computer implementation of the system (1) might
be. Discussing the system (1) at the level of the flowchart shown in Fig.
1 might be dismissed by many as an “implementation issue”. This opinion
must, however, face the following facts: (i) Certification agencies tend to
look at all levels of system implementation and not only the specification
level (1); (ii) the development of code is often not performed by the same
agent that developed the program specifications, thus introducing doubt as
to whether the specification has been faithfully implemented; and (iii) pro-
viding the certification agency with code-level assurance of proper behavior
does not require much effort, which is our main point today: The next sec-
tion of our paper discusses simple, generic philosophies when establishing
“program proofs”, and argues in favor of an “instruction-by-instruction”
analysis approach. This discussion is then applied to describe what consti-
tutes a “proof” for the program shown in Fig. 1. We then conclude this
article by suggesting easy extensions of our discussion.
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Figure 1: Program in flow-chart form
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2 Proving computer programs: Gathering mean-
ing first or not?
When analyzing code, a central issue is the design of what is called the col-
lecting semantics. The collecting semantics describes how much information
from the original program must be retained and compiled in order to verify
the desired property (eg variable boundedness). The collecting semantics
forms the base model on which the analysis is conducted. Higher levels of
semantic collection allow one to define more compact models of the soft-
ware execution, but this task may also be more complex, since information
must be collected over several lines of code and then linked into a compact
model. Thus, lower semantic levels (like line-by-line analyses) are more de-
sirable from the standpoint of analyzer simplicity and adaptability. They
may also improve analysis readability, by linking the analysis closely to the
code itself and remembering that the value of any code analysis improves if
it is more readable. The process that favors high-level semantics collection
first, followed by the analysis of such semantics would correspond to tak-
ing the code in Fig. 1,proving it matches the system specification (1), and
proving the specification (1) is indeed stable using eigenvalue or other stabil-
ity. Such an approach was implemented, for example, in Cousot’s ASTRE´E
analyzer [Fer04, BCC+03b, BCC+03a], which was used to support the cer-
tification process for several large commercial aircraft.
In contrast, the process that favors lower semantics levels, such as “line-
by- line’ analyses would take the code in Fig. 1 and the system specifica-
tion (1) to build a proof that the code satisfies the desired stability property.
The net result is a much more detailed analysis of the code at a level
that stands much closer to its eventual implementation. Another key obser-
vation is to realize that once written, this proof does not require the system
specification 1 to be understood and independently verified. A key tool for
line-by-line analysis may be found in [Pel01, Ch.7], where the author de-
scribes a technique for line-by-line analysis by means of invariants: In this
analysis, which dates back to the 1960’s, each line of code corresponds to
either a test or an assignment. A test has one entry channel and two exit
channels (one for the case when the test is true, and one for when the test
is false). An assignment has one input channel and one output channel,
and consists of a variable update by means of a domainspecific operation.
In the code described in Fig. 1, tests are shown in diamond-shaped boxes,
while assignments are shown in rectangular boxes. For each line of code,
two invariant properties of the code state are guessed: The pre-instruction
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invariant describes a set to which the code state always belongs prior to
instruction execution. The post-instruction invariant(s) describe set(s) to
which the variables always belong after the execution of the instruction.
Given two consecutive instructions named 1 and 2, if the post-instruction
invariant of 1 is the same as the pre-instruction invariant of 2, then the two
instructions can be composed with the guarantee that the pre-instruction
of instruction 1 implies the post-instruction invariant of instruction 2. If
such compatibility conditions hold over the whole program, then it is pos-
sible to use such mechanisms to prove that an entire program is “correct”.
The appeal of such a method is that the elements of proof are distributed
throughout the code, and may be independently verified instruction by in-
struction either manually or using the help of a computer, with no need to
understand the whole “meaning’ of the program. 2 Proving the implemen-
tation of a linear system Consider now the code described in Fig. 1. We use
our previous discussion to show that the correctness of such a code may be
established on a line-by-line basis using ellipsoidal invariants. In the context
of this section, we will say the program is correct if, for bounded initial con-
ditions, the variables inside the program are all bounded. This observation
becomes trivial once we recognize that (i) the proper state-space for the
code consists of x, y and the index variables i and j and (ii) all operations
involving the computer variables x and y are linear in x and y. From a
theoretical perspective, describing the code behavior by means of ellipsoidal
invariants adds little more to the story than simply describing it by means of
(quadratic) Lyapunov functions. However, we find that ellipsoids are easier
to manipulate, in that they eliminate inconvenient singular matrix inverse
computations.
3 Behavior of state variables
The solution to the problem begins with realizing that the relevant state-
space includes both x and y, and that the transformations on x and y are
linear in x and y. For example, the instruction
y[i] := x[i]
is a linear transformation that may also be written
[
y
x
]
=
[
I − eii eii
0 I
] [
y
x
]
= Si
[
y
x
]
(2)
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where eij is a matrix made of zeros everywhere, except at the entry on the
ith row and jth column which is 1. Likewise, the instruction
x[i] := 0
is the linear transformation[
y
x
]
=
[
I 0
0 I − eii
] [
y
x
]
= Pi
[
y
x
]
(3)
and the instruction
x[i] := x[i] +A[i, j]y[j]
is the linear transformation[
y
x
]
=
[
I 0
A[i, j]eij I
] [
y
x
]
= Tij
[
y
x
]
(4)
After a full cycle, the net effect is for x and y to have gone through the
multiplexed operation:
[
y
x
]
=
[
0 I
0 A
] [
y
x
]
= A1
[
y
x
]
(5)
4 Ellipsoids
We use ellipsoidal invariants before and after each instruction in the pro-
gram. Ellipsoids (centered around the origin) are usually defined as
{
z ∈ Rn
∣∣ zTPz ≤ 1} , (6)
where P is a symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix. This definition cap-
tures all ellipsoids whose volume is strictly positive, including infinite when
P is singular. Yet it fails to capture all the finite ellipsoids of interest in this
discussion, including degenerate ellipsoids (eg flat, “pancake-like’ ellipsoids).
For this reason, we prefer to define the ellipsoid ER as
ER =
{
z ∈ Rn
[
R z
zT 1
]
≥ 0
}
, (7)
where R is a symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix. It is easy to see, by
means of Schur complements [BEFB94], that (7) and (6) refer to the same
ellipsoid if P is invertible and P−1 = R. On the other hand, a singular R
indicates a bounded, degenerate ellipsoid.
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5 Behavior of ellipsoids under linear tranforma-
tions
The behavior of ellipsoids under linear transformation is well-known (see,
for example [KV96] for example). Consider the map
z = Tv (8)
where T is a matrix. Then the bounded ellipsoid ER becomes the bounded
ellipsoid ETRTT through the transformation (8). Thus, if (8) corresponds to
a program instruction and ER is a pre-instruction assertion, then ETRTT is
a valid post-instruction invariant.
6 Instruction-level annotation of control programs
with ellipsoidal invariants
With this simple design rule, we can now properly annotate the program
with ellipsoidal invariants at the instruction level. The dimension of the
ellipsoids is 2n since the state include both y and x.
The annotation is shown in Fig. 2, and relies on the definitions of Si, Pi
and Tij given in (2), (3),and (4). For the sake of simplicity, all invariants are
summarized by the corresponding symmetric, semidefinite matrices. Based
on our prior discussion, the coherence of these invariants is trivial throughout
the program, except (i) during the initialization step (computation of Rinit)
and (ii) during the transition from the link denoted N to the link denoted
A, that is, at the end of the outermost program loop: The ellipsoid EVnn
must be contained in the ellipsoid ERinit . For these two properties to hold
we pick Rinit according to the following observations: As noted earlier, the
loop that begins an d ends at the location A performs the following overall
matrix iteration (5) on y and x. Since A is stable, so is A1 and
Vnn = A1RinitA
T
1 . (9)
Thus we can always find P > 0 such that
AT1 PA1 − P < 0. (10)
Let us define
Rinit = αP
−1
where α is a positive scaling parameter. By virtue of Eqs. (10) and (9),
EVnn ⊆ ERinit
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Figure 2: Program annotated with invariants
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whatever the value of α. We then pick α to scale ERinit so as to contain
all allowed initial values of x and y. Assume for example |xi| ≤ 1, yi = 0,
i = 1,≤, n at program initialization. Then xTx+ yTy ≤ n, that is x and y
are contained in the ball EnI . Then let σmax be the largest eigenvalue of P
satisfying (10). σmax is necessarily positive, and the unit ball EI is included in
the ellipsoid EσmaxP−1 . Let α = nσmax. Then the ball EnI is contained in the
ellipsoid EαP−1 = ERinit. The annotation process is now complete. To obtain
the range over which all variables live in, simply compute the union of all
computed ellipsoids above, or compute, say, the minimum volume (or trace)
ellipsoid containing all ellipsoids above, or even siompler the minimum-sized
ball containing all these ellipsoids.
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The following code, written in MATLAB automates this annotation pro-
cess for a given A matrix
%This code does the documentation automatically...
% for a 2x2 system
%Pick an example
A = [0 1;-0.1 -0.2]
Q=eye(4);
A1 = [zeros(2,2) eye(2);zeros(2,2) A]
%P computation
P = dlyap(A1,Q);
%scaling of P
u = max(eig(P));
n = 2;
alpha = 1/u/n/2;
P = alpha*P
%annotation beginning
Rinit = P^(-1);
R0 = Rinit
% i=1
S1 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
S1(1,1)=0;S1(1,3)=1;
T1 = S1*R0*S1
P1 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
P1(3,3) =0;
R1 = P1*T1*P1
% i=2
S2 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
S2(2,2)=0;S2(2,4)=1;
T2 = S2*R1*S2
P2 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
P2(4,4) =0;
R2 = P2*T2*P2
V10 = R2
% i=1 j=1
T11 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
T11(3,1)= A(1,1);
V11 = T11*V10*T11
% i=1 j=2
T12 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
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T12(3,2)= A(1,2);
V12 = T12*V11*T12
% i=2 j=1
T21 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
T21(4,1)= A(2,1);
V21 = T21*V12*T21
% i=2 j=2
T22 = [eye(2,2) zeros(2,2);zeros(2,2) eye(2,2)];
T22(4,2)= A(2,2);
V22 = T22*V21*T22
%end of loop
% This line checks that indeed, the ellipsoid defined by V22
% is contained in that defined by Rinit;
% The computed eigenvalues ought to be all negative
display(Eigenvalues)
[vV22,eV22]=eig(V22-Rinit)
%quit
Conclusion
This paper has shown one process by which it is possible to carry control sys-
tem specification certificates down to their software implementation. This
process has been shown to be relatively straightforward. We hope to have
convinced the reader that this process may be applied to more sophisti-
cated, computer-controlled systems, and that it will eventually lead to the
development of more rigorous, yet flexible, embedded software development
practices, from its specification down to its operation.
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